run perspective. Section 4 presents some modern parallels and modern twists of the crisis.
Section 5 discusses some of the issues in historical perspective for the emerging market economies. Finally section 6 concludes with a discussion of the policy issues.
The Crisis
The crisis occurred following two years of rising policy interest rates. Its causes include : major changes in regulation, lax regulatory oversight, a relaxation of normal standards of prudent lending and a period of abnormally low interest rates . The default on a significant fraction of subprime mortgages produced spillover effects around the world via the securitized mortgage derivatives into which these mortgages were bundled, to the balance sheets of investment banks, hedge funds and conduits( which are bank-owned but off their balance sheets) which intermediate between mortgage and other asset backed commercial paper and long-term securities. The uncertainty about the value of the securities collateralized by these mortgages spread uncertainty about the soundness of loans for leveraged buyouts. All of this led to the freezing of the interbank lending market Reserve. The rescue was justified on the grounds that Bear Stearns exposure to counterparties was so extensive that a worse crisis would follow if it were not bailed out.
The March crisis also led to the creation of a number of new discount window facilities whereby investment banks could access the window and which broadened the collateral acceptable for discounting. The next major event was a Federal Reserve Treasury bailout and partial nationalization of the insolvent GSEs, Fannie and Freddie Mac in July on the grounds that they were crucial to the functioning of the mortgage market.
Events took a turn for the worse in September when the Treasury and Fed allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail to discourage the belief that all insolvent institutions would be saved in an attempt to prevent moral hazard . It was argued that Lehman was both in worse shape and less exposed to counterparty risk than Bear Stearns.
The next day the authorities bailed out and nationalized the insurance giant AIG fearing the systemic consequences for collateralized -default swaps ( insurance contracts on securities) if it were allowed to fail. The fallout from the Lehman bankruptcy then turned the liquidity crisis into a full fledged global credit crunch and stock market crash (as well described in Kindleberger's Manias, Panics and Crashes) as interbank lending effectively seized up on the fear that no banks were safe.
In the ensuing atmosphere of panic, along with Fed liquidity assistance to the commercial paper market and the extension of the safety net to money market mutual funds, the US Treasury sponsored its Troubled Asset Relief Plan ( TARP) whereby $700 billion could be devoted to the purchase of heavily discounted mortgage backed and other securities to remove them from the banks' balance sheets and hopefully restore bank lending. The bill was initially rejected by the Congress but then after the Senate added on to it many politically popular and expensive items was finally passed a week later in the midst of continued financial turmoil.
In early October the crisis spread to Europe and to the emerging countries as the global interbank market ceased functioning . The UK authorities responded by pumping equity into British banks, guaranteeing all interbank deposits and providing massive liquidity.
The EU countries responded in kind. And on October 13 the US Treasury followed suit with a plan to inject $250 billion into the US banks,to provide insurance of senior interbank debt and unlimited deposit insurance coverage for non interest bearing deposits.
Time will tell whether these plans, which are similar to earlier, mainly successful, rescue packages like the RFC in the US in the 1930s and the Swedish and Japanese rescues in the 1990s, may solve the solvency crisis.
Some Descriptive Historical Evidence
Today's turmoil must be viewed in historical perspective. Figure 1 provides some background evidence for the U.S. over the past century. The upper panel from 1953 to September 2008 , shows the monthly spreads between the Baa corporate bond rate and the ten-year Treasury constant maturity bond rate. The spread, inter alia, represents a measure of the financial market's assessment of credit risk and also a measure of financial instability reflecting asymmetric information ( Mishkin 1991) . A key dynamic in the crisis stressed by Mishkin(1997) is information asymmetry, manifest in the spread between risky and safe securities, the consequences of which(adverse selection and moral hazard) are ignored in the boom and come into play with a vengeance in the bust.
Banks played a key role in the traditional story because bank credit in large part financed the boom, and the bust was often accompanied by bank failures and banking panicsevents which eventually made the downturn worse. This led to the traditional case for the monetary authority to act as a lender of last resort and provide liquidity at penalty rates to the money market and or discount window lending to solvent but liquid banks.
Countercyclical monetary policy is also an integral part of the boom-bust credit cycle. Wheelock( 2007a, 2007b) using data for the US and 9 other countries for the past century show that stock market booms occur in environments of low inflation, rising real GDP growth and low policy real interest rates. As the boom progresses and inflationary pressure builds up, central banks( before World War II, driven by the gold convertibility constraint) inevitably tighten their policy rates helping to trigger the ensuing crash. The story is similar for housing booms and busts but they follow a different cycle because of long gestation lags in construction and in the adjustment Of prices to a collapse in demand ( Leamer 2007) .
Stock market crashes can be serious events leading to a decline in wealth and in consumption and also a scramble for liquidity in turn contributing to incipient banking crises. Housing busts also have serious consequences for the banking system via defaults on mortgages, and on the real economy via declining wealth on consumption expenditure, the collapse of residential investment and a financial accelerator effect as net worths The traditional financial crisis story depicts a shock to a major financial or non financial firm leading to a banking panic as depositors attempt to convert their deposits into currency. More recently, especially since the advent of deposit insurance, the source of the pressure has come from the asset side, rather than the liability side of a bank's balance sheet. Examples include the Penn Central episode in 1970 when the collapse of the railroad led to a panic in the commercial paper market which led, like today to concern by the Fed that it would spill over into the banking system. This led the New
York Fed to open the discount window to the money center banks to freely discount non financial firms based on the collateral of sound commercial paper; the Latin American debt default of 1982 when many money center banks became close to insolvent until a massive rescue was orchestrated between the Fed and the IMF; and the collapse of the hedge fund LTCM in 1998 which also was perceived to be a threat to the banking system.
LTCM was rescued by a lifeboat operation by the New York banks orchestrated by the New York Fed .An historical precedent was a crisis in the market for bills of exchange that spread from Amsterdam to Hamburg and which like LTCM led to the failure of the principal player and many others ( Schnabel and Shinn 2001) .In each case the crisis broke in the non bank financial sector but spilled over or threatened to spill over onto the banks who were the ultimate creditors.
Many of the financial crises of the past involved financial innovation which increased leverage. The 1763 crisis was centered on the market for bills of exchange, Penn Central on the newly revived ( in the 1960s) commercial paper market, the savings and loan crisis on the junk bond market, LTCM on derivatives and hedge funds.
Modern Twists
Although there are many historical parallels to the current crisis there are several unique differences. In the most recent episode, the financial innovation derived from the securitization of subprime mortgages and other loans has shifted risk away from the originating banks into mortgage and other asset backed securities which bundle the risk of less stellar borrowers with more credit worthy ones and which were certified by the credit rating agencies as prime. These were absorbed by hedge funds in the US and abroad and in the asset backed commercial paper of the commercial and investment banks. As Rajan ( 2005) presciently argued, shifting the risk away from banks who used to have the incentives to monitor their borrowers to hedge funds and other institutions which do not, rather than reducing overall systemic risk increased it by raising the risk of a much more widespread meltdown in the event of a tail event as we have recently witnessed.
A key modern twist was the growth of the non bank financial sector ( shadow banking system) which was not regulated by the central bank nor covered by the financial safety net. According to Eichengreen (2008) its rapid growth was a consequence of the repeal in Investment banking. These institutions held much lower capital ratios than the traditional commercial banks and hence were considerably more prone to risk. When the crisis hit they were forced to engage in major deleveraging involving the fire sale of assets into a falling market which in turn lowered the value of their assets and those of other financial firms. A similar negative feedback loop occurred during the Great Depression ( Friedman and Schwartz 1963).
Prospects for the Emerging Markets
Financial crises have always had an international dimension as
Morgenstern ( 1959), Kindleberger( 1978) and Bordo( 1986) Europe plays out, then the emergers that are exposed to foreign capital will be affected as well as countries relying for their growth on exports to the US and Europe.
Policy Lessons
The crisis has implications for monetary policy on the key issues of liquidity, solvency and the stability of the real economy. With respect to liquidity the central banks reacted Stearns led the remaining investment banks and other market players to follow riskier strategies than otherwise on the assumption that they also would be bailed out. This surely made the financial system more fragile than otherwise. So that when the monetary authorities decided to let Lehman fail the shock that ensued and the damage to confidence was much worse.
Since the September 2008 crisis it has finally been realized that the deepest problem facing the financial system is solvency. The problem stems from the difficulty of pricing securities backed by a pool of assets, whether mortgage loans, student loans, commercial paper issues, or credit card receivables. Pricing securities based on a pool of assets is difficult because the quality of individual components of the pool varies and unless each component is individually examined and evaluated, no accurate price of the security can be determined.
As a result, the credit market, confronted by financial firms whose portfolios are filled with securities of uncertain value, derivatives that are so complex the art of pricing them has not been mastered, is plagued by the inability to determine which firms are solvent and which are not. Lenders are unwilling to extend loans when they cannot be sure that a borrower is creditworthy. This is a serious shortcoming of the securitization process that is responsible for the paralysis of the credit market.
The Fed was slow to recognize the solvency problem. It emphasized providing liquidity to the market when that is not the answer to the problem of the market's uncertainty ( Bordo and Filardo 2005) . If consequent upon these events the market had not been infused with liquidity as much as they were and for so long, then interest rates would not have been as low in recent years as they were and the housing boom which had just bust may not have expanded as much as it did . Evidence for this perspective by Taylor ( 2007) suggests that interest rates in this period were on average considerably lower than would be the case based on his famous rule.
Some Less Gloomy Lessons from the Crisis
Finally, there are some less gloomy lessons from the crisis. First is the compressed consolidation of the U.S. banking industry. Since the 1990s the U.S. banking system has been slowly consolidating to take advantage of the removal of barriers to interstate banking and branch banking. Canada and most European countries went through this consolidation by mergers and acquisition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Evidence suggests that the U.S. banking system historically was both less stable and less efficient than its Canadian counterpart ( Bordo, Redish and Rockoff 1996) .
The recent crisis by forcing mergers and exit facilitates the move to a banking system with features closer to those of the other advanced countries with a few very large banks.
However because of its legacy of community banking with significant local social capital many smaller banks will survive. Bank of England 's director said about its actions in the Crisis of 1825 he states "" we lent it by every possible means and in modes we never adopted before; we took in stock on security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on the deposits of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short by every means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not on some occasions over-nice. Seeing the dreadful state in which the public were, we rendered every assistance in our power" ( page 52).
Fourth and finally is the speed of response by the monetary authorities in the US and Europe in resolving both the liquidity and solvency aspects of the crisis. This is in contrast to the Great Depression when the Fed did virtually nothing and it was up to FDR by devaluing the dollar in 1933 and the Treasury through its gold purchases thereafter, to jump start the economy . It is also in contrast to the slow response by the Japanese authorities in the aftermath of the collapse of Japan's stock market and real estate bubbles.
